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THE "1992 PROJECT": STAGES, STRUCTURES,
RESULTS AND PROSPECTS*
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann *
I. INTRODUCTION
The "1992 project" has radically changed the European Commu-
nity. It has given the "common market" new impetus and has lifted
the Community out of the deep crisis in which it was bogged down in
the first half of the 1980s. The consensus which has been re-estab-
lished amongst all the Member States through the "internal market"
exercise was enshrined in the Single European Act and the acceptance
of the Delors package in February 1988. The financial underpinning
of the "1992 project," through the reform of the structural funds and
the Community's finance system, has given the "internal market" ex-
ercise such credibility in the eyes of the public that it has increasingly
taken on a life of its own: since the first half of 1988, 1992 has become
a strategic date for business and industry both inside and outside the
Community.
Governments have geared themselves to the "1992 project" in the
same way as have companies and trade unions. In the Community,
the main concern is to become or remain competitive with other Mem-
ber States. Outside the Community, there is growing concern over
missing out on the internal market. As a result, a fundamental debate
on accession or association with the Community has arisen in the Eu-
ropean Free Trade Association and other European non-Community
countries. These concerns have spawned the efforts to enhance sub-
stantially the preferential relations enjoyed by the Mediterranean and
African, Pacific and Caribbean countries and have increased the im-
portance of a successful conclusion to the GATT Uruguay round in
1990.
The internal market project has already opened up the future path
beyond the magic date of December 31, 1992. It is the economic and
political basis for the plan on economic and monetary union, which,
though it has met with considerable resistance, has been endorsed by
* This text forms part of an extensive study published under the title DER WEG IN DEN
BINNMARKT UND DIE INTEGRATION EN OSTERREICHS (H.G. Koppensteiner ed. 1990).
0* The author is currently the Director General for Competition of the Commission of the
European Communities. The views expressed herein are purely those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those held by the Commission.
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one European Council after another. The joint work on achieving the
internal market and the efforts towards economic and monetary union
have clearly brought out what was evident from the very outset to the
initiators of the "1992 project": namely, that the endeavor would in-
volve decisive steps along the road to European Union. This was ex-
pressly stated as being an objective of the Single European Act.1
The historic changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe
are no doubt primarily due to their peoples and to Gorbachev. How-
ever, as the European Council meeting in December 1989 pointed out,
"the success of a strong and dynamic European Community ' 2 con-
tributed to the process, as did the "attraction which the political and
economic model of Community Europe holds for many countries."' 3
This attraction is also recognized by the U.S. administration, which
sees the European Community as having a central role in the future
architecture of Europe.4 The "1992 project" is at the core of the Com-
munity's "magnetism" 5 and therefore has a paramount role in the fu-
ture of the European Community, the economic and political
development of Europe as a whole and, indeed, the growth and peace
of the world.
II. GENESIS OF THE "1992 PROJECT" AND MAIN STAGES
IN ITS DEVELOPMENT
A. The White Paper
The "1992 project" lies at the heart of the strategy adopted by the
Commission which took up office in January 1985 under the Presi-
dency of Jacques Delors. It was first mentioned in the new President's
speech to the European Parliament on the Commission's program for
1985.6 At the request of the European Council held in March 1985, 7
the Commission presented a white paper a few weeks later in which
the concept of the large internal market and the methods to achieve it
1. Single European Act, art. 1, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1 (1987), BULL. EC, Supp.
2/86, at 7 (1986).
2. Conclusions of the European Council in Strasbourg, 22 BULL. EC, No. 12 (1989) (not yet
published).
3. Id.
4. Excerpts from Baker's Speech on Berlin and U.S. Role in Europe's Future, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 13, 1989, at A18, col. 1.
5. President's News Conference in Brussels, Belgium, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1891
(Dec. 11, 1989).
6. Programme of the Commission for 1985: Statement by Jacques Delors, President of the
Commission, to the European Parliament And His Reply to the Ensuing Debate, BULL. EC, Supp.
4/85, at 11 (1985).
7. European Council in Brussels, 18 BULL. EC (No. 3) 13 (1985).
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were set out.8 The White Paper was endorsed in principle by the Eu-
ropean Council at its meeting in Milan in June 1985. 9 At the same
time, the European Council held in Milan opened the door to the sec-
ond stage of the "1992 project" by deciding to convene a governmen-
tal conference on the amendment of the EEC Treaty.' 0 This led to the
Single European Act a few months later.
The White Paper is certainly the most ambitious and successful
legislative program ever adopted by the Community. It is ambitious
in the new concept it puts forward, going beyond all previous legal and
political obligations relating to the establishment of the "common
market" or of an "internal market." The radicalness of its approach is
evident not so much in the objective of "welding together individual
markets of the Member States into one single market of 320 million
people,""II but rather in the way in which this welding process is de-
fined in detail.
The White Paper distinguishes between three distinct types of bar-
riers which must be removed in order to achieve the internal market:
(a) Material barriers which lead to controls at internal frontiers.
The reasons underlying such barriers have to do primarily with trade,
economic, health, statistical and security considerations.
(b) Tax barriers, which are a particular kind of material barrier.
These are due to differences in turnover taxes and excise duties, which
give rise to checks when goods are imported and exported.
(c) Technical barriers, which are all other obstacles standing in the
way of the free movement of personal goods, services and capital, not
based on frontier controls. Examples include differences in norms and
standards, obstacles impeding participation in public invitations to
tender and the non-recognition of degrees and diplomas.
The conceptual innovation in the White Paper lies in the way it
deals with material and tax barriers. The objective. of the White Paper
is not to make the frontiers between Member States easier to pass
through by simplifying controls at internal frontiers. The aim instead
is to eliminate internal frontier controls "in their entirety"',2 by the
end of 1992. The White Paper thus requires more than the Member
States had previously ever been ready to concede to the Community.
It also goes beyond what could be deduced from the previous case law
of the Court of Justice on the concept of the common market and the
8. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET:
WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL (1985)[hereinafter WHITE
PAPER]
9. European Council in Milan, BULL. EC (No. 6) 14-15 (1985).
10. Id. at 14.
11. WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 5.
12. Id. at 9.
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four basic freedoms.13
The White Paper is ambitious not only in its concept, but also in its
methodology. Once again, the key innovation lies not in the require-
ment that the objective be achieved by the end of 1992. The Commu-
nity, applying Jean Monnet's well-established method, has set such
deadlines many times in its history, with mixed success. What is
unique here is the scope and volume of the legislative program laid
down in the White Paper. Never before had a Commission found the
courage to draw up a complete list of all the legal instruments whose
adoption seemed necessary for the establishment of the "common
market" and to commit itself to presenting such legal instruments ac-
cording to a precise timetable.
The comprehensive and supposedly definitive nature of the famous
list of "300 Directives," 14 which has subsequently shrunk to first 279,
and lately to 282,15 is probably one of the main keys to the outstanding
success of the White Paper. Because of this comprehensive but brief
list, an operation which by its nature was immensely complex was sim-
plified to such an extent that it became politically acceptable, immedi-
ately transparent and capable of being constantly monitored. The list
provides a criterion against which successes and setbacks achieved or
suffered by the Community on the road to achieving the large internal
market can be measured on a daily basis. It is the spur which drives
the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council and, above all,
the country which holds the current presidency of the Council.' 6
The comprehensive nature of the list is, moreover, a key factor in
ensuring that one of the basic preconditions for the success of the
"1992 project" is met. It prevents individual components of the inter-
nal market program from being separated from the whole. Any such
separation would jeopardize the edifice as a whole. For example, the
13. Cowan v. Tr~sor Public, Case 186/87 (E. Comm. Ct. J., Feb. 2, 1989).
14. Some were actually regulations.
15. The decrease is due to the withdrawal and combining of a number of proposals. Com-
pleting the Internal Market: Progress Report Required by Article 8B of the Treaty, E.C. CoMM'N
Doc., COM (88) 650 final, at 4 [hereinafter Completing,"the Internal Market]; see also Fifth Re-
port of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Concerning the Implementa-
tion of the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market, E.C. COMM'N Doc., COM (90)
90 final, at 6.
16. Since 1986, the Commission has been publishing at even shorter intervals annual reports
which provide information on the Community institutions' work on the internal market program
and which are the focus of increasing attention (see the latest report, Fourth Progress Report of
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, E.C. COMM'N Doc., COM (89) 311
final and COM (89) 311/2 final).
In 1989, the Commission also reported for the first time on the implementation in the Mem-
ber States of the legal acts adopted by the Community. See Communication on Implementation
of the Legal Acts Required to Build the Single Market, E.C. COMM'N Doc., COM (89) 422 final.
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retention of any one type of border control (e.g., indirect taxes) would
provide a pretext for other controls. The economic and political bene-
fit of the "1992 project" would then be largely destroyed.
The decision to simplify the operation did have its price: the
White Paper and the list it contains are actually not complete. This
can be demonstrated convincingly from just one example. The White
Paper does not make any mention of the barriers standing in the way
of an internal energy market. These were first listed in a report pub-
lished on May 2, 1988.17 However, such gaps have never detracted
from the persuasive power of the White Paper.
The outstanding success of the White Paper is due not only to the
concept and structure of the legislative program. It is also based on
the systematic use of new principles in the legal harmonization process
which reduce the burden on the Community. The new approach relies
on the principle of mutual recognition and the use of European
standards.
The Community owes the principle of mutual recognition primar-
ily to the European Court of Justice and its case law on article 30 of
the EEC Treaty.'" The principle can be used in two ways for the pur-
poses of harmonization of laws. First, it makes legal harmonization
wholly superfluous in cases where mutual recognition is alone suffi-
cient to remove material, technical and tax barriers. 19 An example of
this may be seen in the case law of the Court of Justice on the legisla-
tive provisions governing foodstuffs (e.g., beer, pasta, sausages, etc.)
and the Commission's refusal to correct the consequences of such case
law through harmonization proposals.
Second, the principle of mutual recognition can be used as part of
the legal harmonization process in cases where the prohibitions laid
down in the EEC Treaty are not alone sufficient to bring about free-
dom of movement for persons, goods, services and capital. Instead of
introducing regulations to cover all aspects of a given area in detail, as
was done in the past, the Community now confines itself to laying
down only the essential principles, leaving the rest to the principle of
mutual recognition. This is well illustrated by the examples of the
directives on mutual recognition of degrees and diplomas 20 and on the
17. The Internal Energy Market (Commission Working Document), E.C. COMM'N Doc.,
COM (88) 238 final.
18. Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung ftir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
19. WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 19, 22.
20. WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 25-26; Council Directive 89/48/EEC of 21 December
1988 Relating to a General System for the Recognition of Higher-Education Diplomas Awarded on
Completion of Professional Education and Training of at Least Three Years' Duration, 32 O.J.
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freedom of credit institutions to provide services.21
Even where use is made of European standards, Community legis-
lation does no more than establish essential principles. However, com-
pliance with such principles is not left to the various rules and
regulations applicable in the Member States or the Member States'
recognition of their equivalency. Instead, the European standards in-
stitutes such as CEN and CENELEC are given the task of working
out European standards which manufacturers can work from and
which can guarantee the free movement of goods and services. 22
Reliance on the principle of mutual recognition and use of Euro-
pean standards reduce the need for central Community legislation.
They are an expression of the principle of subsidiarity, which is daily
becoming more important for the work of the Community's institu-
tions and to which the Commission is firmly wedded. 23 The frequency
with which the Council, acting on Commission proposals, actually
makes use of the principle of mutual recognition points to the growing
trust among the Member States. However, the move away from uni-
form detailed Community legislation is probably also a reflection of a
different attitude toward the setting of standards in the Member States
compared with previous decades. State (and hence also Community)
regulation of the economy is increasingly viewed critically. The slash-
ing and pruning of State rules and regulations to reduce structural
obstacles are widespread preoccupations in the Member States which
benefit the achievement of the internal market program. The crucial
contribution of the "1992 project" to bringing about changes in the
economic structures in the Member States is thus also reflected in the
methods and techniques applied in Community legislation.
B. The Single European Act
The ambition and imagination of the White Paper's authors would
not in themselves have been sufficient to make it the most successful
legislative program in the history of the Community. Despite the
political and economic need to create a large economic area without
EUR. COMM. (No. L 19) 16 (1989)[hereinafter Council Directive on a General System for Recogni-
tion of Diplomas].
21. WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 28; Second Directive on the Coordination of Laws, Regu-
lations, and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking up and Pursuit of the Business of
Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780/EEC, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 386) 1
(1989)[hereinafter Second Directive on Banking].
22. WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 19-20; Council Directive 89/392/EEC of 14 June 1989 on
the Approximation of the Laws of the Member States Relating to Machinery, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No L 183) 9 (1989) [hereinafter Council Directive 89/392/EEC].
23. See, e.g., the speech given by the President of the Commission. Jacques Delors at the
College of Europe in Bruges, Agence Europe Documents, No. 1576, at 1 (Oct. 21, 1989).
1102 [Vol. 11:1097
"1992 Project"
internal frontiers to compete with the United States and Japan, despite
the appeal of the new concept of the elimination of all internal frontier
controls "in their entirety" 24 and despite the originality of the methods
used to achieve these goals, the White Paper would certainly have
shared the same fate as previous action plans if the "1992 project" had
not entailed amendment of the EEC Treaty.
The historical roots of the Single European Act are deeper than the
internal market initiative instigated by the first Delors Commission.
The decision adopted by the European Council in Milan at the end of
June 1985 to convene an intergovernmental conference on the amend-
ment of the EEC Treaty25 would in all probability not have come
about without the momentum for institutional change generated by
the European Parliament. Altiero Spinelli, the promoter of the Euro-
pean Parliament's draft Treaty on Political Union,26 must therefore be
regarded as one of the progenitors of the Single European Act, even if
his original initiative was scarcely recognizable in the text formulated
by the inter-governmental conference.
The Single European Act, negotiated in the record time of only
three months, 27 represents the most comprehensive and most impor-
tant amendment to the EEC Treaty to date. With its provisions on
cooperation in economic and monetary policy, social policy, economic
and social cohesion, research and the environment, the Single Euro-
pean Act goes well beyond the "1992 project." However, the core and
the "raison d'etre" of the amendments are the provisions on the inter-
nal market. However important the political pressure exerted by the
European Parliament may have been, without the basic political con-
sensus on the "1992 project," the Single European Act would not have
been negotiated, signed and ratified by 'all the Member States.
The Single European Act was intended primarily to make two con-
tributions to the achievement of the internal market program. First,
its aim was to clarify the powers of the Community in areas where
they had been disputed. Hence, the paramount importance of the defi-
nition of the internal market in the newly added article 8A of the EEC
Treaty. However, even greater importance was attached to the simpli-
fication of the decision-making process within the Council. For this
purpose, the prime need was to replace the unanimity requirement as
much as possible by the majority voting system. In addition, the
Council was to be relieved of some of its tasks by transferring a greater
24. WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 9.
25. European Council in Milan, supra note 9, at 14-15.
26. European Parliament, draft Treaty establishing European Union, February 1984.
27. See J. DE RuYT, L'ACTE UNIQUE EUROPtEN (1989), for a description of its genesis.
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number of implementing powers to the Commission. Finally, the Eu-
ropean Parliament was to be brought more into the Community legis-
lative process without detracting from the necessary flexibility newly
conferred on the decision-making process.
Two to three years after its entry into force, it is clear that, in the
crucial area of simplifying the decision-making process within the
Council, the Single European Act has been startlingly successful. The
Single European Act has, in most areas relating to the internal market,
replaced the unanimity requirement with the possibility of majority
voting. Substantial use has been made of this possibility, and was in-
deed exercised it even before the Single European Act entered into
force.28
Even if the Single European Act has not resulted in a spectacular
increase in the number of majority votes,29 a look at the statistics
shows just how much the Council's internal decision-making process
has quickened. The acceleration is well illustrated by the following
diagrams, in which the duration of discussions within the Council on
comparable Directives before and after the entry into force of the Sin-
gle European Act is compared.
28. The first important majority vote, breaking what had been the political practice for de-
cades, took place at the end of the intergovernmental conference in December 1985. Though the
United Kingdom and Denmark voted against it, the Council decided by a majority, on the basis
of article 43, to prohibit the use of hormones in meat production. The vote was the first sign that
the negotiations on the Single European Act had removed the taboo surrounding the voting
problem. See also the decision by the European Court of Justice rejecting the Directive, though
it did so on formal grounds and not because of the choice of the legal basis. United Kingdom v.
Council, Case 68/86 (E. Comm. Ct. J., Feb. 23, 1988).
29. As of November 10, 1989, the picture was as follows:
Joint Position Final Decision
QM Unan. QM Unan.
2nd half 1987 6 17 2 4
1st half 1988 13 16 5 20
2nd half 1988 5 17 4 17
1st half 1989 10 22 4 24
2nd half 1989 1 11 1 2
TOTAL 35 83 16 67
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TIME ELAPSED BETWEEN THE TRANSMISSION TO THE COUNCIL OF
A DIRECTIVE AND ITS ADOPTION -- BEFORE AND AFTER THE
SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT.
1. Standards and Technical Regulations
before SEA after SEA
40
31.5
30-
20-
13
10-
0
83/189 88/182
Directive
3. Chemical Products: Fertilizers
before SEA aftter SEA
50
4 8
40
30
20 13
10
0
76/116 89/284
Directive
5. Cosmetic Products
before SEA afuer SEA
76/768 88/667
Directive
2. Motorvehicles: Motorcycles
before SEA aftter SEA
78/1015 87/56 89/235
Directive
4. Lawnmowers
before SEA afuer SEA
80
69
60
40
20 15
0
84/538 88/180 88/181
Directive
6. Electromagnetic Compatability
before SEA after SEA
100 8
82
80
56 60
040I L
73/23 75f322 76/889 76/890 89/336
Directive
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7. Mutual Recognition of Diplomas 8. Financial Services/Banks
before SEA after SEA before SEA after SEA
121 100
100 90 80
C ~60
50 41 40 23 27 22 20
i11L 
20
0 10
7M2 77A62 7 11/U 71026M54 S0 W IMs $9, /11"7 39/29 9946 39 7
Directive Directive
The reasons for the quickening of the decision-making process are
obvious: the possibility of majority voting prompts all the delegations
to show greater flexibility in negotiations, so that the presidency can
frequently establish a consensus where disagreement would have per-
sisted under the unanimity requirement. The new methods adopted in
the legal harmonization process referred to earlier also help to facili-
tate decision-making within the Council.
The Single European Act did not, of course, address the Luxem-
bourg compromise. 30 Its critics saw this as one of the factors which
would make the reform process ineffective. 31 Experience has proved
them wrong: so far, no majority decision under the Single European
Act has been blocked under a "vital interest" pretext.
The Single European Act does, however, provide for the possibility
of allowing individual Member States temporary derogations; 32 it
even, under certain conditions, allows Member States not to apply
measures adopted by a qualified majority. 33 Critics of the Single Euro-
pean Act have seen these provisions as posing great dangers.34 But
actual events have refuted such claims. Derogations agreed within the
30. The Luxembourg compromise of January 1966, which in effect amounts to an agreement
to disagree, put an end to a deep constitutional crisis between France and its Community part-
ners over the use of majority voting. While all agreed that Member States should try to reach a
consensus, five of the original six accepted that in the end it might be necessary to vote while
France maintained its objections to majority voting when "very important interests" were at
stake. This essentially transformed a great deal of decisions to implement the treaty into meas-
ures requiring unanimous consent. For a discussion of the Luxembourg compromise, see E.
STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPEC-
TIVE 63 (1976).
31. J. PESCATORE, DIE "EINHEITLICHE EUROPAISCHE AKTE" - EINE ERNSTE GEFAHR
FOR DEN GEMEINSAMEN MARKT, 153 (1986). See also Pescatore, Some Critical Remarks on the
"Single European Act," 24 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 9, 13 (1987).
32. Single European Act, supra note 1, art. 8C.
33. Single European Act, supra note 1, art. 100A.
34. See J. PESCATORE, supra note 31, at 158.
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Council have so far been surprisingly few. No use whatsoever has so
far been made of the possibility of opting out.
While the situation concerning decisions taken by majority voting
has been gratifying, the situation regarding unanimity has been disap-
pointing. One sector of the internal market program in particular has
been left subject to the unanimity requirement - taxation. Not a sin-
gle important Commission proposal in this area has as yet been ac-
cepted by the Council. The alignment of tax legislation is therefore
one of the three weak points in the record so far in implementing the
"1992 project."
Another unsatisfactory aspect is the situation concerning the trans-
fer of implementing powers to the Commission. The basic decision
adopted in July 1987 rationalized procedures.3 5 However, it has not
resulted in any significant transfer of powers from the Council. Nor
has it done a great deal to alter the mistrust involved in the assignment
of implementing tasks to the Commission. Consequently, disputes be-
tween the Commission and the Council over the extent and procedures
for transferral of implementing powers frequently stand in the way of
rapid decision-making and force the Council to take decisions unani-
mously even in cases where the Treaty normally allows them to be
taken by a qualified majority. 36
In order to ensure greater participation of the European Parlia-
ment in the legislative process, the Single European Act made provi-
sion for the application of the cooperation procedure in all instances in
which the Council can act by a qualified majority in the internal mar-
ket area.37 Contrary to widespread fears, this procedure has resulted
neither in the blocking nor in the delaying of the Community decision-
35. Council Decision of 13 July 1987 Laying Down the Procedures for the Exercise of Imple-
menting Powers Conferred on the Commission, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 197) 33 (1987); see
also Delegation of Executive Powers to the Commission, Report from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Parliament, EUR. COMM'N Doc., SEC (89) 1591 final.
The Council decision of July 13, 1987, has reduced the number of procedures under which
the Commission exercises implementing powers to seven. In assigning implementing powers to
the Commission, the Council must choose from among only these seven procedures.
The procedures are different in detail, but all pursue the same objective. They determine
under what circumstances the Commission alone is entitled to exercise the implementing powers
and to what extent it shares these powers with the Council.
36. Where the Council wishes to amend a Commission proposal, it must of course act unani-
mously, pursuant to article 149(1) of the EEC Treaty. Treaty Establishing the European Com-
munity, opened for signature Mar. 25, 1957, art. 149(1), 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
37. Before the entry into force of the Single European Act, the European Parliament had to
be consulted by the Council, but Parliament's opinion had no binding effect. The new coopera-
tion procedure refines the traditional consultation process in two ways. The European Parlia-
ment has to be reconsulted (second reading) if it does not agree with the Council's position. In
addition, if in its second reading the European Parliament rejects this position, voting require-
ments in the Council change; the Council can eliminate the European Parliament's veto only by
a unanimous vote.
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making process. At the same time, however, it has given the Euro-
pean Parliament much more influence than might have been expected
from a purely legal point of view. The European Parliament has thus
in the last few years become an increasingly important partner in the
carrying out of the internal market program.
While the Single European Act has made an extraordinarily posi-
tive contribution to speeding up the decision-making process, the clari-
fication which it was hoped it would achieve regarding the
controversial question of the Community's powers to implement the
internal market program has not so far been achieved. Specifically, in
the negotiations on the Single European Act, the aim was to give the
Community the power to lay down rules on the free movement of per-
sons, including cases concerning aspects of free movement not involv-
ing economic concerns. For example, the abolition of personal checks
at internal frontiers requires the alignment of Member States' rules
and regulations relating to the granting of asylum, the issuing of visas,
the combating of the drug trade, terrorism, etc.3 8 Although the new
article 8A, in conjunction with articles 100 and 235, must ultimately
be interpreted to mean that the Community actually holds such pow-
ers,39 they nevertheless continue to be disputed. The Member States
are accordingly endeavoring to abolish personal checks within the
framework of the Schengen agreement 4" and in the group of responsi-
ble persons set up by the European Council in Rhodes in December
1988.41 It is not surprising, given the complexity and political sensitiv-
ity of the subject matter, that such purely intergovernmental coopera-
tion is difficult and is making extremely slow headway. 42 Accordingly,
after the alignment of tax legislation, the abolition of personal checks
is the second of the three areas in which the implementation of the
internal market program has so far fallen short.
Despite these shortcomings, the Single European Act is rightly re-
garded as being equivalent, in the institutional sphere, to what the
"1992 project" represents in the economic and political sphere. The
Single European Act has become an institutional symbol of the eco-
nomic and political success of the internal market program. Probably
none of the participants at the intergovernmental conference in the
autumn of 1985 foresaw such a development. The authors of the Sin-
38. WHITE PAPER, supra note 8, at 14-16.
39. See Ehlermnann, The Internal Market Following the Single European Act, 24 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 361 (1987).
40. GEMEINSAMES MINISTERIALBLATT 79 (1986).
41. Rhodes European Council, 21 BULL EC (No. 12) 8 (1988).
42. European Council in Strasbourg, 22 BULL. EC (No. 12) 10 (1989) (not yet published).
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gle European Act thus find themselves in a comparable position to the
authors of the White Paper, whose boldest hopes were exceeded by the
impact which the "1992 project" actually made worldwide.
C. Reform of the Community's Finances:
The Delors Plan
The Single European Act laid the constitutional and institutional
basis for achieving the "1992 project." However, it would not have
been sufficient on its own to ensure that the white paper was successful
in meeting its objectives. The negotiations on the Single European Act
had made it plain that there was an inextricable political link between
the internal market program and concerns of domination of the poorer
Member States by the richer Member States. Accordingly, the new
provisions on "economic and social cohesion" introduced by the Sin-
gle European Act had to be given life as quickly and as convincingly as
possible. This was the aim of the Delors plan, which was tabled in
February 1987 and adopted by the European Council in Brussels a
year later.
In June 1984, the European Council temporarily ended the long-
standing dispute on the British budgetary problem and provided the
Community with financial resources of its own.43 However, the Coun-
cil allocated only meager resources to it because of the Member States'
consternation over the slow pace of reform in the common agricultural
policy. This insufficient funding was soon consumed by the accession
of Spain and Portugal, thus causing a financial shortfall. 44 The Com-
munity lacked the money to step up the assistance it provided to the
poorer Member States. However, a further increase in its own re-
sources was politically feasible only if the financing of the common
agricultural policy could be overhauled, i.e., in particular, if the man-
agement mechanisms of the common agricultural market were
reformed.
The Delors plan is accordingly based essentially on three main
planks:
a reform of the common agricultural policy which would prevent the
build-up of new surpluses, speed up the reduction of existing stocks and
give farmers some prospects for the future;
a reform of the Community's finances that would give it sufficient
43. Fontainebleau European Council, 17 BULL EC (No. 6) 7 (1984).
44. See The Single Act: A New Frontier, BULL. EC, Supp. 1/87, at 5, 16 (1987); also pub-
lished as Making a Success of the Single Act. A New Frontier for Europe, E.C. COMM'N Doc.,
COM (87) 100 final. See also Report from the Commission to the Council and Parliament on the
Financing of the Community Budget, E.C. COMM'N Doc., COM (87) 101 final.
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resources of its own by the end of 1992, which Would be raised from the
Member States, in a more equitable fashion than previously and which
would be used on the basis of multiannual financial planning endorsed
by the European Parliament;
a reform of the Community's structural Funds, leading to greater
efficiency in their use through rationalization, concentration, and im-
proved coordination, and entailing a doubling of financial resources
available to them by the end of 1992. 4 5
III. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 'THE ADOPTION
OF THE DELoRs PLAN
The adoption of the Delors plan by-the European Council in Feb-
ruary 1988, after only one year .of discusion/4 6 further consolidated
the consensus between the Meniber States on the strategy of imple-
menting the "1992 project." As in the case of the Single European
Act, the agreement of the national parliaments had to be obtained,
since the reform of the Commuqity's financial system is equivalent to
an amendment to the EEC Treaty. For the first time, the general pub-
lic began to realize that the "1992 project" had to be taken seriously.
The adoption of the Delors plan thus, marks a turning point on the
road to 1992 that was politically even more profound and significant
than the approval of the SingleEprop.ap!Act. italowed the Commu-
nity to concentrate all its resources or. chieving'the internal market
program and it made the "1992 O~ojet" iredible in many quarters. In
the spring of 1988, the rising,.tide:of m(4i- reporting on "1992," which
took all observers by surprise; grdually ept over'the whole of West-
ern Europe and by the summer pof' the "saine-ear had spilled over to
Japan and the United States, fr6n .where Jtwashed lack to the Com-
munity under the headline "Fortr'ss Europe."
In the spring of 1988, it also became clear for the first time that
politicians, businessmen and trade unionists were beginning to gear
themselves to the prospect of the large internal market. Everywhere,
people began to discuss their own country's competitiveness in relation
to that of other Member States. A good example of this can be found
in the debate within Germany on. the advantages and disadvantages of
the Federal Republic as a location for business and industry.
Legislative changes began for the first time, or at any rate to a
much greater extent than before, to'take account of the effects they
might have on competition within he conrmon market. Amendments
were spontaneously made to natidhal law to improve national compet-
45. The Commission's Programme for 1987, Bu .,EC, Supp. 1/87, at 35 (1987).
46. Brussels European Council, 21 BULL. EC (No. 5) 8 (1988).
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itiveness, with future Community rules being frequently anticipated.
Indeed, national law was in some cases actually aligned even in cases
where there were as yet no Community directives requiring such align-
ment (e.g., the lowering of excise duty and value added tax rates in
Denmark, France, Ireland and the Netherlands).
In the countries adjoining the Community, concern began to grow
that they might miss out on the developments taking place within the
Community. Discussions on the advantages and disadvantages of
membership, especially among the EFTA countries, grew increasingly
intense. This concern was not allayed by the Commission's decision in
principle, in May 1988, to give the "1992 project" priority over any
new accession negotiations 47 or by the suggestion of the Commission
President, Jacques Delors, to seek a third way between a free trade
agreement and accession to govern relationships between the Euro-
pean Community and EFTA. 48 The suggestion was welcomed by the
EFTA heads of government at their summit meeting in Oslo in March
198949 and led to a joint conference of Foreign Ministers5° the same
month in Brussels to discuss the possibility of exploratory talks be-
tween the Commission and the EFTA governments. 5' However, at
the beginning of July 1989, Austria decided to submit its application
for accession to the Community.5 2 A few weeks later, the application
was passed to the Commission for examination in accordance with ar-
ticle 237 of the EEC Treaty.53
In the Eastern European countries adjoining the Community,
Gorbachev's perestroika and the success of the "1992 project" led to a
desire to normalize relations with the European Community. For this
purpose, at the end of June 1988, a joint declaration by the EEC and
COMECON was assigned in Luxembourg under which the members
of COMECON ended a thirty-year policy of hostility, rejection and
non-recognition. 54 Immediately thereafter, all the Central and East-
47. External Relations, 21 BULL. EC (No. 5) 61, 66 (1988).
48. Inauguration of the New Commission, 22 BULL. EC (No. 1) 8-9 (1989).
49. Meeting of the EFTA heads of government, Oslo, Mar. 14-15, 1989, Statement, EFTA
Doc. 6 /89/Sp., Mar. 15, 1989.
50. See Council of the European Communities, The Joint Statement Issued by the Conference
on 20 March 1989, 45 PRESS RELEASE, Mar. 30, 1989.
5 1. The results of these exploratory talks are incorporated in Council of the European Com-
munities, The Joint Statement Issued by the Joint Foreign Ministers' Conference of European
Community and EFTA Countries in Brussels on 19 December 1989, 252 PRESS RELEASE, Dec.
19, 1989.
52. 22 BULL. EC (No. 7/8) 70 (1989).
53. Written Question No. 353/89 by Mr. Dalsass to the Council, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C
305) 24 (1989).
54. Joint Declaration on the Eytablishment of Official Relations Between the European Eco-
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ern European COMECON countries established diplomatic relations
with the Community."5 Shortly thereafter, negotiations began on
trade and cooperation agreements, which were subsequently signed
with Hungary (September 1988), Czechoslovakia (December 1988),
Poland (September 1989) the USSR (December 1989) and the German
Democratic Republic (May 1990).56
Across the Atlantic, following a period of deep skepticism about
the Community's future, there was a sudden outburst of interest in the
"1992 project." From mid-1988, all the earlier talk of "Eurosclerosis"
died away. Instead, as in Japan, concern was increasingly expressed
that the Community could develop into an economic "fortress."
However, the campaign against "Fortress Europe" began to ease early
in 1989. The newly-appointed Commission managed, in a series of
meetings, to refute American charges and dissipate exaggerated fears.
A particularly helpful aspect of this was the clearer understanding
achieved of the reciprocity provisions in the proposal for a second
banking directive, thus removing a major stumbling block.57 A fur-
ther factor was the strikingly positive attitude adopted by the new U.S.
President, George Bush, to the Community, first expressed in his Bos-
ton speech of May 21, 1989.58
Just how seriously the "1992 project" has been taken since early
1988 is reflected particularly clearly in the attitude of businessmen.
The prospect of a large internal market became part of the strategic
planning of trade and industry inside and outside the Community. It
began to have a key influence on investment decisions by businesses,
nomic Community and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
157) 35 (1988).
55. USSR August 10, 1988
GDR August 10, 1988
Bulgaria August 10, 1988
Hungary August 10, 1988
Czechoslovakia August 10, 1988
Poland September 16, 1988
Cuba September 28, 1988
56. The negotiations with Bulgaria are currently still continuing, while those with Romania
were frozen while Ceausescu ruled the country.
57. Second Directive on Banking, supra note 21. Contrary to what many think, this means
that the Community's financial services market will be open to the world and the Community
hopes its approach will be followed by other countries. The so-called "reciprocity" clause in the
Second Banking Directive provides for negotiations with third countries which do not grant the
EC banks competitive opportunities comparable to those granted by the EC to non-EC banks.
Consideration to limit or suspend new authorizations would only be considered in cases where
EC banks do not enjoy national treatment and the same competitive conditions as that country's
own banks and where effective market access for EC banks is impossible.
58. Remarks at the Boston University Commencement Ceremony in Boston, Massachusetts,
25 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 747 (May 29, 1989); Remarks to the Residents of Leiden, the
Netherlands, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRiES. Doc. 1116 (July 24, 1989).
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making an important contribution to growth in the Community. The
following table, which is taken from the Commission's latest annual
economic report, and updated June 14, 1990,19 shows this clearly:
Annual % change 1980-82 1983-85 1986-88 1989-91*
GNP Growth +0.8 +2.1 +3.1 +3.2
Investment -1.7 +1.2 +5.8 +5.1
Employment -0.6 0 +1.3 +1.3
Inflation 12.1 7.2 3.6 4.6
* Forecasts for 1990-91
The extraordinarily positive trend in growth, investment and
employment since 1988 indicates, moreover, that the much-criticized
estimates in the famous Cecchini Report 6° were not significant
overstatements.
While most businessmen and industrialists in the Community view
the "1992 project" favorably, 61 employees, particularly in the more
prosperous Member States, fear a drop in their social welfare rights
and benefits. Their fear is understandable, but unfounded. To counter
it, the Community has, since the European Council meeting in
Hanover in June 1988, given greater emphasis to the social dimension
of the internal market.62 This culminated in the approval of the social
charter 63 by the heads of state and government of eleven Member
States at the European Council meeting in Strasbourg in December
1989. This charter reflects what the Member States described as their
deep attachment to a model of social relationships based on joint
traditions and customs.64
However, the social charter is not a legally binding instrument, but
merely a solemn declaration. To give it practical effect, further legal
59. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, FACING THE CHALLENGES OF THE
EARLY 1990s: ANNUAL ECONOMIC REPORT 1989-90 (1990); The Community Economy at the
Turn of the Decade, Analytical Studies, 42 EUROPEAN ECONOMY 12 (1989).
60. The Cecchini Report is the result of the most comprehensive study ever made of the
macroeconomic effects of the "1992 project." The study estimates that the implementation of the
internal market program (1) can increase the Community's prosperity by DM 400,000 million;
(2) will boost the growth of GNP of the "Twelve" to 4.5%; (3) will cut consumer prices in the
Community by 6.1% and (4) will create a net growth in employment of 1.8 million or, given
dynamic economic policy, by as much as 5 million. The results of the study are set out in a
readily accessible presentation in CECCHINI, THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 1992: THE BENEFITS
OF THE SINGLE MARKET (1988).
61. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 30 EUROBAROMETER (1988); 31, 32
EUROBAROMETER (1989).
62. Hanover European Council, 21 BULL. EC (No. 6) 164, 165 (1988); Rhodes European
Council, 21 BULL. EC (No. 12) 8, 9 (1988); Madrid European Council, 21 BULL EC (No. 6) 10
(1989).
63. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNITY CHARTER OF BASIC
SOCIAL RIGHTS FOR WORKERS (1990).
64. Id.
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instruments must be adopted. The measures which, in the
Commission's view, have to be enacted by the Community were set
out in an action program which the Commission adopted at the end of
November 198865 and which the European Council took note of in
Strasbourg.
IV. SUCCESSES AND DIFFICULTIES IN GIVING EFFECT
TO THE WHITE PAPER
The above remarks have highlighted the institutional and political
preconditions that had to be met if the "1992 project" was to be suc-
cessful. They have also outlined some of the far-reaching changes
which the internal market program has brought about inside and
outside the Community. Let us now take stock of the work which has
already been successfully completed on the basis of the White Paper.
As mentioned earlier, the original 300 legal instruments listed in
the White Paper were reduced to 282.66 The Commission has in the
meantime presented the necessary proposals on all of them. Of the
282 proposals referred to in the White Paper, a total of 149 have so far
been finally adopted by the Council. In addition, there are seven pro-
posals which the Council has adopted only in part. A further six pro-
posals have been agreed to by the Council after a first reading;
however, the second reading has not yet been completed. Accord-
ingly, up to May 31, 1990, the Council has adopted almost 60% of the
legal instruments provided for in the White Paper.
A critical assessment of what has been achieved is of course more
difficult. However, all observers will probably agree that the greatest
success so far has been in the creation of a common financial market.
The total liberalization of capital movements, 67 the second Banking
Directive68 and a directive on solvency, 69 and directives on life assur-
ance70 and the insurance of large industrial risks71 are the key deci-
65. Communication from the Commission Concerning its Action Programme Relating to the
Implementation of the Community Charter of Basic Social Rights for Workers, E.C. COMM'N
Doc., COM (89) 568 final.
66. Completing the Internal Market, supra note 15.
67. Council Directive 88/361/EEC of 24 June 1988 for the Implementation of Article 67 of
the Treaty, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 178) 5 (1988).
68. See Second Directive on Banking, supra note 21.
69. Council Directive 89/647/EEC of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency Ratio for Credit Insti-
tutions, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 386) 14 (1989).
70. Second Directive on Life Assurance (not yet published).
71. Second Council Directive 88/35 7/EEC of 22 June 1988 on the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Direct Insurance Other than Life Assurance
and Laying down Provisions to Facilitate the Effective Exercise of Freedom to Provide Services-and
Amending Directive 73/239/EEC, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 172) 1 (1988).
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sions adopted"by, the Counc thisarea.
Another area in whicth'tbeC cil-has so far been particularly
successful is that of the ali~iitent F. technical 'standards and norms.
One example .is the Directive. ifI mahinery,72 which is based on the
new concept of approximation of laws, referred to earlier. Other note-
worthy decisions taken by the Council .include the liberalization of
public procurement, 73 . the liberalization. of the transport of goods by
road,74 the mutual recognition of 4', higher-education diplomas, 75 the
"television without fronti6rs".: lirective, adopted with enormous diffi-
culty,76 and merger contrOI,7 .77 .
However, the successes, so (iar .ingiving effect to the White Paper
contrast with areas in which there have been substantial difficulties.
The program had, as already fiibA 'tioned, fallen behind schedule in the
removal of personal ch"k, at fridtieis. , The main work is being car-
ried out outside the community insifttions. The greatest advances so
far have been made among the. five Member States which concluded
the Schengen agreement amongst themselves. 78 Such cooperation in
smaller groupings does, of course,. act as a precursor for cooperation
amongst the Twelve. Consequently, any delay within the group of five
countries concerned threatens to have a negative impact on efforts
within the so-called Rhodes group.7 9 For this reason, the postpone-
ment of the signing of an additional agreement to the Schengen agree-
ment which was to take place in December 1989 has been generally
regretted. 80
The program has also fallen behind schedule, as mentioned previ-
ously, in the approximation of tax legislation. This, together with the
abolition of personal checks at frontiers,' is certainly economically and
politically the most difficult part of the internal market program. Pro-
gress is hampered by the unanimity requirement, which continues to
72. Directive 89/392/EEC supra note 22.
73. Council Directive 89/440/EEC of 18 July 1989 Amending Directive 71/305/EEC Con-
cerning Coordination of Procedures for the. Award of Public Works Contracts, 32 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 210) 1 (1989). .I
74. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4059/89 of 21 December 1989 Laying Down Conditions
Under Which Non-Resident Carriers May Operate National Road Haulage Services Within a
Member State, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 390) 3 (1989).
75. Council Directive on a General System of Recognition of Diplomas, supra note 20.
76. Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 8 October 1989 on the Coordination of Certain Provi-
sions Laid Down by Law, Regulation, or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the
Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 298) 23 (1989).
77. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concen-
tration Between Undertakings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 395) 1 (1989).
78. GEMEINSAMES MINISTERIALBLATF, supra note 40, at 79.
79. Rhodes European Council, supra'note 41:,
80. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitun, D.. 16, 1989, at 2.
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apply in this area. Although the Council did, in November and De-
cember 1989,81 agree in principle to remove all tax controls at the
Community's internal frontiers as of January 1, 1993, the decision was
subject to a reservation by Denmark, which has not yet withdrawn its
objection to the removal of all exemption limits for private travel.
Furthermore, the Council has so far managed to agree on guidelines
only for value added tax alignment; similar guidelines for excise duty
harmonization have not yet been agreed on. Finally, the Council will
have to incorporate its political decisions of principle into legally bind-
ing instruments, which will have to be given effect in national law by
the Member States. In the area of tax law alignment, therefore, the
progress made towards creating an area without internal frontiers has
been minimal.
Lastly, the program has fallen behind schedule in the harmoniza-
tion of veterinary and plant health legislation. The difficulties are not
due to the requirements of the EEC Treaty, since it is clear from the
case law of the Court of Justice in recent years that the Council can
adopt decisions by a qualified majority.8 2 However, the legal stan-
dards that have to be harmonized are of such technical complexity
that the Council is scarcely able to engage in genuine discussion on
them. Reaching decisions is made all the more difficult by the differ-
ences of opinion that exist on the scope and procedures for allocating
implementing powers to the Commission, and to overcome these diffi-
culties the Council is forced into unanimous voting.83
V. OUTLOOK
Despite the difficulties and risks described above, it is entirely fea-
sible to meet the December 31, 1992, deadline for abolishing all con-
trols at the Community's internal frontiers. However, this can be
done only if the political will to achieve the "1992 project" does not
weaken. On the contrary, all the Member States should realize that
the greater demands being placed on the community by events outside
call for an acceleration and reinforcement of the integration process.84
81. Removal of Tax Frontiers, 22 BULL. EC (No. 11) 17 (1989); Abolition of Tax Frontiers,
22 BULL. EC (No. 12) 32 (1989) (not yet published).
82. United Kingdom v. Council, Case 68/86 (E. Comm. Ct. J., Feb. 23, 1988); United King-
dom v. Council, Case 131/86 (E. Comm. Ct. J., Feb. 23, 1988); Commission v. Council, Case
131/87 (E. Comm. Ct. J., Nov. 16, 1989); United Kingdom v. Council, Case 11/88 (E. Comm.
Ct. J., Nov. 16, 1989).
83. Treaty Establishing the European Community, supra note 36, art. 149(1).
84. Jacques Delors at the College of Europe in Bruges, supra note 23. See also Conclusions of
the European Council in Strasbourg, supra note 2: "It is in the interest of all European States that
the Community should become stronger and accelerate its progress towards European Union."
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The "1992 project" will, in the months and years ahead, remain at
the center of the Community's strategy. Neither the project on eco-
nomic and monetary union (EMU) nor new steps on the road to polit-
ical union will displace it from this central position.
The EMU project is of course not new; we have only to think of
the Werner plan, the creation of the European monetary system
(EMS) and the adoption of the European currency unit (ECU) to see
its progenitors. 85
However, the initiative taken by the European Council in Hanover
in June 1988 to revive EMU is not conceivable without the success of
the "1992 project." The same is true of other advances which have
since been made, such as the unanimous adoption of the Delors re-
port,86 the decision taken by the European Council in Madrid in June
1989 to introduce the first stage of EMU on July 1, 1990,87 and the
decision taken by the European Council in Strasbourg in December
1989 to convene the inter-governmental conference on the drafting of
the EMU Treaty before the end of 1990.8
With the opening of the inter-governmental conference by the end
of 1990, the EMU exercise will increasingly occupy the Community
institutions. Progress on the road to EMU will have positive repercus-
sions on the "1992 project," just as success in creating the large inter-
nal market will stimulate and give impetus to the work on EMU.
However, the order of priorities must not be forgotten in the process:
the completion of EMU is not a precondition for achieving the "1992
project."8 9 By contrast, the completion of the internal market is an
essential component of the first stage in the process of creating
EMU.9O
EMU will probably not be the only subject of the inter-governmen-
tal conference in opening in December, for which the Community has
been preparing. Certainly since the Commission President's recent
speech to the European Parliament on January 17, 1990, setting out
the Commission's program for 1990, it is becoming increasingly clear
85. COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF THE ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION, ECONOMIC
AND MONETARY UNION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1989)[hereinafter DELORS REPORT].
86. European Council, 22 BULL. EC (No. 4) 8 (1989).
87. European Council, 22 BULL. EC No. 6) 8, 11 (1989).
88. Strasbourg European Council, 22 BULL. EC (No. 12) 8 (1989) (not yet published).
89. "Although in many respects a natural consequence of the commitment to create a
market without internal frontiers, the move towards economic and monetary union repre-
sents a quantum jump which could secure a significant increase in economic welfare in the
Community. Indeed, economic and monetary union implies far more than the single market
programme and will require further major steps in all areas of economic policy-making."
DELORS REPORT, supra note 85, at 16.
90. Id. at 34.
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that the urging of Jacques Delors and the European Parliament for
new institutional reforms (going beyond the changes required by
EMU) has the backing of a growing number of Member States. The
Italian Presidency, which will begin its work on July 1, 1990, will take
up this latest initiative with passion, energy and resolution. In so do-
ing, it will be able to draw on its experience in June 1985 when, against
the resistance of three Member States, particularly the United King-
dom, it got the European Council meeting over which it was presiding
in Milan to convene the inter-governmental conference which six
months later led to the Single European Act.
The "1992 project" can only benefit from a new constitutional re-
form. Because of the next elections to the European Parliament in the
summer of 1994, the reform will have to lead to a strengthening of the
rights of the European Parliament. However, such strengthening of
its rights is conceivable only if, at the same time, the last remaining
bastions of unanimous voting in the Council are removed. It is less
certain whether the European Parliament will also gain greater influ-
ence over the composition of the Commission, particularly the ap-
pointment of its President, although this would be extremely desirable
in order to increase the efficiency, cohesion and authority of the execu-
tive. This would probably also make an important contribution to
greater transfer of implementing powers from the Council to the
Commission.
There remains the question of whether the defacto accession of the
German Democratic Republic possibly taking place at the end of this
year will not, in practice, slow down the "1992 project." I am con-
vinced that this will not be the case. Even if the attention of the Ger-
man public is dominated almost exclusively by the events in the
German Democratic Republic, the political leaders in the Federal Re-
public of Germany have not so far weakened in their European com-
mitment. On the contrary, the upheavals in Central and Eastern
Europe have led to a quickening of the integration process.
The astonishing progress on the road to EMU and the most recent
discussions on new institutional reform are the clearest proof of the
acceleration of this process. This makes achievement of the "1992
project" easier. For only a Community which is seriously resolved to
achieve political union will be ready to overcome the obstacles still
looming on the final, steepest stretch of the road leading to the
achievement of an internal market wholly free of internal frontiers.
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